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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  study  capital  ﬂows  in  a panel  of  130  countries,  and  derive  the
implications  for  the  observed  patterns  of  capital  ﬂows  and  capi-
tal  controls  before  and  into  the  crisis  of  2008–11.  We  ﬁnd  that  the
size of  capital  ﬂows  is  positively  correlated  with  country’s  income
level.  In addition,  capital  ﬂight  has  a non-linear  relationship  with
the  income  level.  Using  the  Hansen  threshold  estimation,  we  iden-
tify  a three-stage  threshold  effect:  for  low-income  countries  (GDP
per  capita  below  US$  3,000),  capital  ﬂight  increases  as the  income
level  rises;  and  only  after  the  economy  passes  a threshold  level  (GDP
per  capita  above  US$  5,000),  capital  ﬂight  declines  with  income.
We  conclude  with  a case  study  of Brazil  and  Korea,  observing  that
the  decisions  to  implement  capital  control  measures  tend to  be
pushed  around  by  the  feedbacks  among  economic  growth,  currency
appreciation,  and  the  global  ﬁnancial  conditions.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper provides a detailed investigation on the capital ﬂows in a panel of 130 countries (covering
advanced, emerging and less developed countries) over the past three decades. The objective is to
compare the patterns and determinants of capital ﬂows, and understand how economic fundamental
affect capital ﬂows, as well as the policies directed at capital ﬂows of recent years, i.e. capital controls,
especially before and into the crisis of 2008–11. We  consider four measures of capital ﬂows: (i) Total
capital inﬂow, (ii) Total capital outﬂow, (iii) Net capital outﬂow, and (iv) Capital ﬂight. Firstly, we
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update the estimates on the capital ﬂows for the 130 countries spanning 24 years from 1980 to 2003.
The estimation results show that there are differences in the patterns of these measures of capital ﬂows
across developing and industrial countries. Rich countries experience higher volumes of total capital
inﬂows and outﬂows, and also have higher net capital outﬂows. Poor countries, which are less open
in trade and ﬁnancial sectors, receive less total capital inﬂow and experience higher outward capital
ﬂight during certain stages of development, especially when their capita income level is relatively
low.
Secondly, from both cross-sectional and panel regression estimation results, we ﬁnd that there is a
non-linear relationship between capital ﬂight and economic development. There is an inverse U-shape
relationship between capital ﬂight and income level, as measured by GDP per capita. Using the Hansen
threshold estimation method, we identify a three-stage threshold effect of economic development on
capital ﬂight: below the threshold, capital ﬂight increases as income level rises; Only after passing the
threshold level of income, capital ﬂight decreases with GDP per capita. This threshold effect is unique
to capital ﬂight and economic development; a similar threshold effect for net outﬂows, total outﬂow,
and total inﬂow could not be detected.
Lastly, we look at the cases of Brazil and Korea, both of which are beyond our estimates of the
threshold development level. While the concern over currency appreciation and volatility of capital
ﬂows continues to be important, the observations on their recent management of capital ﬂows suggest
that a country’s decision to implement the control measures has become more inﬂuenced by the global
market conditions especially since the crisis of 2008.
This paper is related to several strands of the capital ﬂow literature. The ﬁrst explores the driving
forces of international capital movements, many of which attempt to establish theoretical models to
explain how different factors (i.e. wealth, investment return, risks) affect capital ﬂows.1 The second
studies capital ﬂight, including both theoretical and empirical studies on the deﬁnition, measure-
ment and determinants of capital ﬂight.2 As a special category of capital outﬂows, capital ﬂight has
attracted interests since the 1980s debt crisis in developing countries; due to its distinct nature, the
measurements and determinants of capita ﬂight are different from typical capital ﬂows. The third set
of literature examines linkages between ﬁnancial liberalization and international capital movements;
a majority of these papers attempt to measure ﬁnancial openness and explore the effects of ﬁnancial
openness on capita ﬂows, economic growth, and ﬁnancial crisis.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the data and methodology for
measuring capital ﬂows and capital ﬂight, and reports the patterns of capital ﬂows in a sample of
130 countries, using time-series and 5-year average of individual and groups of countries. Section 3
provides statistical analysis on capital ﬂows. An interesting observation from both cross-sectional and
panel data regressions is that capital ﬂight, unlike other types of capital ﬂows, shows a distinct non-
linear relationship with income level (GDP per capita in PPP). To check the robustness of this ﬁnding,
we also test the non-linear relationship using the Hansen Threshold model. In Section 4, we provide
a case study of capital controls of Brazil and Korea. Section 5 concludes.
1 The standard neoclassical models state that capital ﬂows are driven by scarcity, and therefore capital should ﬂow from rich
to  poor countries. Lucas (1990) points out a paradox to the standard theory: capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries seem small
relative to the level predicted by the models. Despite the rapid growth of international capital markets and ﬁnancial integration,
the  capital inﬂows to developing countries remain low compared to the levels observed among the OECD countries. Theoretical
and  empirical studies offer several explanations to the paradox (see for example Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008;
Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2007; Ju & Wei, 2006), but the dust has yet to settle. See Jones, Ceolho, et al. (1986),  Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2002a, 2002b), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Alfaro and Hammel (2007), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), Verdier (2008),
Devereux and Sutherland (2009),  and Wincoop and Tille (2010).
2 The early use of this phrase is Kindleberger (1938) who deﬁnes capital ﬂight as “abnormal ﬂows propelled from a
country.  . .by.  . .one or more complex list of fears and suspicions”. According to Kindleberger, a capital outﬂow should be excep-
tional, sudden, and arise from adverse, almost pathological expectations for it to qualify as capital ﬂight. The working deﬁnition
of  ‘capital ﬂight’ was  revised by Dooley (1986), Cuddington (1986), Lessard and Williamson (1987), and Cumby and Levich
(1987).  See also Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Pattillo (1999) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2001, 2003).
3 See Edwards (2005, 2007) and Edwards and Rigobon (2009), Evans and Hnatkovska (2005), Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008),
Prasad, Rajan, et al. (2007), Honig (2008),  and Neumann, Penl, and Tanku (2009).
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Fig. 1. Capital ﬂows and income level. (a) Total capital inﬂow. (b) Total capital outﬂow. (c) Net capital outﬂow. Notes: The ﬁgure
provides a scatter plot of the relationship between capital ﬂows and the level of income for each country. In (a) the Y-axis is
the  estimated total capital inﬂow to GDP ratios; (b) the Y-axis is total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios; (c) net capital outﬂow and
graph. In each graph, the X-axis is GDP per capita, PPP in US dollar. Average data over the period of 1980–2003 are used for 130
countries.
2. Patterns of capital ﬂows
We  examine in details the aggregate capital ﬂows, including: total capital inﬂow, total capital
outﬂow, net capital outﬂow and capital ﬂight. Total capital inﬂow,  which is the sum of short- and long-
term capital inﬂows as reported under FDI inﬂow and portfolio inﬂow in the balance of payment. Total
capital outﬂow is deﬁned as the sum of short-and long-term capital outﬂows as reported in the balance
of payments; it consists of foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad and portfolio investment outﬂow.
Data on FDI and portfolio investment ﬂows are obtained from the International Financial Statistics
(Lines 78bdd and 78bfd for outﬂow and Lines 78bed and 78bgd for inﬂow). The dataset covers 130
countries over the period of 1980–2003. Net capital outﬂow is taken as a current account surplus,
obtained from the World Development Indicators. Current account balance is the sum of net exports
of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. A positive ﬁgure, or a surplus, implies net
capital outﬂow from and country, and a negative ﬁgure implies net capital inﬂow.
To measure Capital ﬂight, we use the broadest measure—the residual (or World Bank) method.4
The World Bank method compares the sources of capital (the change in external debt and net for-
eign direct investment), with the uses of capital (a current account deﬁcit and the change in ofﬁcial
reserves). Capital ﬂight occurs when sources of capital exceed uses of ﬁnance, hence, the residual:
CF = Debt + FI − CAD − FR,  where CF is capital ﬂight according to the residual method,  denotes
change, Debt is stock of gross external debt reported in the World Bank data, FI is the net foreign
investment inﬂows, CAD is the current account deﬁcit and FR is the stock of ofﬁcial foreign reserves.
This measure covers all unreported capital outﬂow, including assets of both the banking and non-
banking sectors. The data used for the calculation of capital ﬂight are taken from various sources. Data
on capital ﬂight from developing countries are taken from the World Development Indicators 2005
(WDI), while data from the Source OECD are used for computing capital ﬂight from all the industrial
counties and a number of developing countries.5 We  use extensive sources of databases to derive the
controlling variables, detailed in Appendix A. While we  try to be comprehensive on the data collection
across years and countries, the number of observation for each country ranges from 15 to 24 years.
2.1. Capital ﬂows & income
Figs. 1 and 2 plot the four types of capital ﬂows as percentage of GDP, by GDP per capita (PPP). As
shown in Fig. 1, the three types of ﬂows, i.e., total capital inﬂow, total outﬂow and net capital outﬂow
4 There are at least three reasons for using the residue method: (i) it is the most often used method in capital ﬂight literature
since the 1990s; (ii) it is the broadest measure, covering all unreported capital outﬂow so as to minimize potential biases in
narrower terms; (iii) the data availability for this method allows the largest sample size for this study. See also the Dooley
method, the hot money method, and the asset method in the references cited.
5 Only data on External Debt for industrial countries and a few developing countries are from Source OECD, whereas the rest
of  data used for capital ﬂight calculation are all from WDI.
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Fig. 2. Capital ﬂight and income level. (a) 130 countries. (b) Without outlier. (c) Capital ﬂight. Notes: The ﬁgure provides a
scatter plot of the relationship between capital ﬂight and the level of economic development for each country: (a) plots average
capital ﬂight for 130 countries; (b) is for 129 countries after drop the outlier, Kuwait; (c) shows only countries with positive
capital ﬂight. In each graph, the X-axis is GDP per capita, PPP in US dollar and the Y-axis is estimated total capital inﬂow to GDP
ratios. Average data over the period of 1980–2003 are used for 130 countries.
are all positively correlated with a country’s income level. As shown in Fig. 2, there seems to be a
non-linear relationship between capital ﬂight and economic development. We  can see more clearly
from Fig. 2 panel (b) (after dropping the outlier Kuwait) the inverse U-shape between capital ﬂight
and GDP per capital for 129 countries in the sample. This inverse U-shape may  imply that there is
a threshold effect of economic development on capital ﬂight: below the threshold level of economic
development, capital ﬂight will increase as economy grows; until when the economy grows into a
stage beyond the threshold level, capital ﬂight will begin to decline.
Table 1 provides a detailed comparison between capital ﬂight and capital ﬂows from developing
and industrial countries. Average annual capital ﬂight in US$ does not differ much between industrial
and developing economies; however, when taken as a ratio to GDP, capital ﬂight from developing
countries is almost twenty times of that from industrial countries. On the other hand, normal capital
outﬂow shows an opposite pattern from capital ﬂight: In US$, capital outﬂow from industrial countries
is more than 100 times of that from developing countries. When we consider the effect of economy
size, capital outﬂow as ratio to GDP from industrial counties is still more than 5 times of that from
developing countries. In summary, capital ﬂight and normal capital outﬂow show opposite patterns
for industrial and developing countries: developing countries register high levels of capital ﬂight but
have low capital outﬂow, while industrial counties experience large volume of capital outﬂow and
almost no capital ﬂight or even negative capital ﬂight.
2.2. Capital ﬂows & ﬁnancial openness
Two commonly used methods for measuring ﬁnancial integration are considered. The ﬁrst is the
capital account openness index (KAOPEN) developed by Chinn and Ito (2006),  constructed as the ﬁrst
principle component of the four IMF  binary variables in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions. It has a wide coverage (more than 100 countries) for a long time period
Table 1
Capital ﬂows and capital ﬂight.
Flows/country group Industrial countries (Obs: 22) Developing countries (Obs: 108)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Capital ﬂight (US$ mil.) 701 10400 642 2250
CF/GDP (%) 0.089% 1.643% 1.663% 4.378%
Net  capital outﬂow (US$ mil.) −3520 39000 −289 2050
NetOutﬂow/GDP (%) −0.434% 2.989% −4.320% 6.039%
Total  capital inﬂow (US$ mil.) 36200 53000 1170 3250
Inﬂow/GDP (%) 6.597% 6.378% 2.494% 2.931%
Total  capital outﬂow (US$ mil.) 35400 37600 332 1030
Outﬂow/GDP (%) 4.539% 7.261% 0.860% 1.765%
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Fig. 3. Capital ﬂows and ﬁnancial openness. (a) Total capital inﬂow. (b) Total capital outﬂow. (c) Current account surplus. (d)
Capital ﬂight. Notes: The ﬁgure provides a scatter plot of the relationship between four types of capital ﬂows (capital ﬂight, net
capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and outﬂow) and the level of ﬁnancial openness for each country. In graph (a) the Y-axis is
estimated total capital inﬂow to GDP ratios, in graph (b) the Y-axis is total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios, graph (c) net capital
outﬂow and graph (d) capital ﬂight to GDP ratios. In each graph, the X-axis is the Chinn-Ito measure of capital account openness.
Average data are used for 130 countries over the period of 1980–2003.
(1970–2003). The second measure of ﬁnancial openness is the Capital Mobility index (Cap Inx) con-
structed by Edwards (2007),  which combines Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002),  and with
information from country-speciﬁc sources. The two measures are highly correlated, with a correlation
of 0.88. Fig. 3 shows the scattered plots of the four types of capital ﬂows to GDP ratio by ﬁnancial open-
ness for the 130 countries. The X-axis is the KAOPEN (Chinn & Ito, 2006) measure of capital account
openness. Except capital ﬂight, the size of capital ﬂows is positively correlated with ﬁnancial openness.
The similar patterns can be found using the other ﬁnancial openness measure.
2.3. Capital ﬂows & economic growth
Fig. 4 provides the scatter plots of capital ﬂows by the level of GDP per capita growth. The top row
suggests that higher levels of total capital inﬂows and outﬂows are correlated with higher economic
growth rate. The bottom-left plot shows a negative association: net inﬂows tend to enter fast growing
counties. The bottom-right plot suggests a negative association between capital ﬂight and growth.
3. Empirical estimation
In this section, we examine the pattern of capital ﬂows formally, controlling for fundamentals and
economic openness. The sample includes annual observations for a total of 130 countries, of which
22 are industrial countries and 108 are developing countries, covering the period 1980–2003. The
baseline regression models include cross-country OLS estimations using sample averaged data, panel
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 4. Capital ﬂows and economic growth. (a) Total capital inﬂow. (b) Total capital outﬂow. (c) Net capital outﬂow. (d) Capital
ﬂight.  Notes: The ﬁgure provides a scatter plot of the relationship between the four types of capital ﬂows (capital ﬂight, net
capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and outﬂow) and the rate of economic growth (GDP per capita). In graph (a) the Y-axis is the
estimated total capital inﬂow to GDP ratios; in graph (b) the Y-axis is total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios; graph (c) net capital
outﬂow; and graph (d) capital ﬂight to GDP ratios. In each graph, the X-axis is the GDP per capita growth rate. The plots use
average data for 119 countries over the period of 1980–2003.
estimation using annual data and ﬁve-year average data. We  add to the literature by checking the
non-linear relationships between capital ﬂows and the controls, using the Hansen threshold regres-
sion methods.The dependent variables are capital ﬂows to GDP. We  use a number of economic controls,
including GDP per capita, ﬁnancial openness, trade openness, education, inﬂation, growth, real inter-
est rate, currency overvaluation, corruption, political risk, institutional quality. Table 2 reports the
correlation matrix of the variables. As shown, capital inﬂow and outﬂow are highly correlated, with a
correlation coefﬁcient of 0.75. Net capital outﬂow and capital ﬂight are also highly correlated, with a
correlation of 0.55. Net capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and total outﬂow are all positively corre-
lated with fundamental factors, including income, trade and ﬁnancial openness, education, political
development and other institutional variables. The determinants for capital ﬂight, however, could not
be clearly detected in the correlation matrix. Among the controlling variables, multi-collinearity could
be an issue as, for instance, GDP per capita is highly correlated with a number of other explanatory
variables. In order to avoid this problem, some variables that have a sample correlation with GDP per
capita higher than 0.7 are dropped from the baseline estimation.
3.1. Baseline estimation
Both cross-country OLS regressions and panel regressions have been performed to test the signiﬁ-
cance of explanatory variables. One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility
of signiﬁcant measurement error in annual data and business cycle ﬂuctuations. We  also construct a
panel of non-overlapping 5-year average for each country. Applying this 5-year average panel on all
Author's personal copy
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Table  2
Correlation matrix of capital ﬂows and explanatory variables.
CFlight/GDP NetOut/GDP Inﬂow/GDP Outﬂow/GDP
NetOut/GDP 0.5480* 1 −0.0828 0.3483*
Inﬂow/GDP −0.0037 −0.0828 1 0.7537*
Outﬂow/GDP 0.0737 0.3483* 0.7537* 1
GDPPC 0.0517 0.3816* 0.4074* 0.5984*
CAP INX. 0.0350 0.2079* 0.4330* 0.5150*
KAOPEN 0.0758 0.2431* 0.3588* 0.4627*
SCHOOL 0.1079 0.3337* 0.4028* 0.4002*
INF 0.0671 −0.2661* 0.0089 −0.1069
GROWTH −0.1684* −0.0972 0.3589* 0.1454
RIR −0.1237  −0.1226 −0.0045 −0.0147
POLITY −0.0705 0.1275 0.3714* 0.3119*
OVAL −0.0440 −0.3536* −0.2261* −0.1751
CORR.  −0.0945 0.1740* 0.4556* 0.5026*
POL.RISK 0.0079 0.3496* 0.5385* 0.5719*
INST. −0.0192 0.3141* 0.5301* 0.5545*
OPENF 0.2579* 0.2009* 0.4348* 0.4559*
Notes: This table presents the pair-wise correlations between the four dependant variables: CFlight/GDP, NetOut/GDP,
Inﬂow/GDP and Outﬂow/GDP and the economic controls. Average data for the period 1980–2003 are used for each country.
* 10% signiﬁcance level.
the variables for the period 1980 to 2003 reduces the 24 annual observations to 5 time-series obser-
vations. The novel part of our estimation is to investigate the effect of development threshold on the
pattern of capital ﬂows. This can be done by (i) including the squared term of the controlling variable;
(ii) conducting a formal threshold estimation. Following (i), GDP per capita and its squared term allow
for a possible non-linear relationship with capital ﬂows:
CFi = ˛i + ˇ1Yi + ˇ2Y2i + ˇ3Z ′i + εi,
where CFi is average capital ﬂows as ratios to GDP, ˛i is a constant (subscript i indicates countries), Yi
is the average GDP per capita PPP, a proxy of economic development, and Y2
i
is its quadratic form. Z ′
i
is a vector of all other explanatory variables, and εi is a random error term.
3.1.1. Cross-country regression
Table 3 provides the cross-country regression results. A result that appears to be fairly robust across
countries is the effects of GDP per capita and its squared terms are signiﬁcant in the regressions of
capital ﬂight. For the other three types of capital ﬂows, only the coefﬁcients of the GDP per capita
terms are signiﬁcant, but not the squared terms (i.e. the net outﬂow equation; the squared term are
dropped in the other two to increase the degree of freedom), indicating that these types of ﬂows may
be linearly correlated with income. Moreover, for regressions on capita ﬂight, the coefﬁcient on the
GDP per capita term is signiﬁcantly positive and the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term is signiﬁcantly
negative. This suggests that the relationship between capital ﬂight and economic development is not
linear, but rather an inverse U-shape.
An explanation for this inverse U-shaped correlation of capital ﬂight and GDP per capita may  be
that during the initial stage of economic development, i.e. low level of GDP per capita, the domestic
residents are gradually accumulating wealth domestically and abroad, the latter which is the source
for both capital outﬂows and outgoing ﬂight of capital. Capital ﬂight, in particular, is encouraged by
unstable property rights, domestic economic and political condition; the domestic residents choose
to take their wealth aboard in other safer places. At this stage, inward foreign investment and foreign
lending may  lead to even higher capital ﬂight. As the economy continues to grow, economic and
political conditions improve and better institutions are established, the residents gain more conﬁdence
in the domestic economy, and no longer need to put their assets abroad to avoid government control
or potential losses from expropriation. Consequently, capital ﬂight may  decrease as GDP per capita
and economic development has improved.
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Table  3
Cross-country regression results.
CFlight/GDP NetOut/GDP Inﬂow/GDP Outﬂow/GDP
GDPPC 0.889 0.599 0.107 0.271
(0.214)*** (0.255)** (0.092) (0.097)***
GDPPC2 −0.031 −0.012 – –
(0.007)*** (0.009) – –
RIR −0.009 0.014 −0.041 −0.033
(0.047) (0.056) (0.053) (0.056)
INF −0.001 −0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITY −0.359 −0.385 0.119 −0.002
(0.088)*** (0.104)*** (0.099) (0.104)
OPENF 0.182 0.223 0.532 0.62
(0.111) (0.132)* (0.121)*** (0.127)***
GROWTH −0.496 −0.33 0.483 0.162
(0.194)** (0.231) (0.222)** (0.235)
KAOPEN 0.555 0.659 0.614 0.707
(0.432) (0.513) (0.479) (0.506)
OVAL 0 −0.013  −0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004)
Constant −1.016 −4.429 −1.189 −3.122
(0.959) (1.140)*** (0.972) (1.026)***
Observations 75 75 71 71
R-squared 0.42 0.56 0.48 0.57
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports cross-country regressions using the country-average data for all the
variables over the period 1980–2003. Dependent variables are the capital ﬂight, net capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and
total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios. Explanatory variables include: GDPPC is GDP per capita, PPP. GDPPC2 is the square term of
GDPPC.  OPENF is the gravity model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy (10) and autocracy (−10).
RIR  is the annual domestic real interest rate. INF: Annual domestic inﬂation rate, consumer prices (annual %). KAOPEN is the
Chinn-Ito measure for capital account openness. OVAL is exchange rate over-valuation. GROWTH is the annual GDP per capita
growth rate.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
The coefﬁcient on trade openness is positive and signiﬁcant for all other types of capital ﬂows,
but not for capital ﬂight. This suggests that openness may  stimulate the size of normal capital ﬂows
across borders, but not capital ﬂight. We  also test the possibility of a non-linear relationship between
trade openness and capital ﬂight; however, the coefﬁcient on the squared term of trade openness is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero. On one hand, trade openness may  lead to higher capital ﬂight
because it provides easier access to foreign markets, thereby increasing capital ﬂight through the mis-
invoicing. On the other hand, higher trade openness also indicates a higher level of development in
the domestic ﬁnancial markets, better institutions and investment environment; higher openness may
reduce capital ﬂight as holding domestic assets become more attractive. The coefﬁcients of political
development are negative for regressions on capital ﬂight and net capital outﬂows. This suggests that
capital ﬂight decreases as a country become more politically open to public and more democratic;
dictatorship and autocracy encourage residents to place their wealth abroad to avoid the control
from their government. The sign and signiﬁcance of the POLITY variable conﬁrm with the theoretical
hypothesis. Among all the other additional variables, the cross-country regressions show that the
economic growth rate is another important factor. In the regression on capital ﬂight, the coefﬁcient
of growth rate is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that higher economic growth rate reduces capital
ﬂight. In the regression on total capital inﬂow, the coefﬁcient of growth rate is signiﬁcantly positive,
indicating higher growth rate attracts more capital inﬂows.
3.1.2. Panel estimation
To increase the sample size and the efﬁciency of estimation, we  pool all the annual data and
apply the panel estimation. The panels are non-overlapping 5 year averages for each country; using
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Table  4
Panel estimation.
CFlight/GDP NetOut/GDP Inﬂow/GDP Outﬂow/GDP
GDPPC 2.906 1.251 0.722 1.298
(0.828)*** (0.450)*** (0.180)*** (0.193)***
GDPPC2 −0.052 – – –
(0.021)** – – –
RIR −0.064 −0.011 0.005 −0.018
(0.036)* (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
INF 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
POLITY −0.195 0.046 −0.010 −0.055
(0.17) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
OPENF −0.713 −1.216 −1.275 −1.418
(0.70) (0.383)*** (0.379)*** (0.404)***
GROWTH 0.385 0.092 0.300 0.403
(0.228)* (0.12) (0.128)** (0.135)***
KAOPEN 0.912 0.244 0.450 0.304
(0.69) (0.38) (0.390) (0.42)
OVAL 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.004)*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −19.942 10.197 24.638 3.565
(17.02) (9.26) (9.343)*** (3.61)
Country dummy  Yes
Year dummy  Yes
Observations 238 238 226 225
R-squared 0.58 0.85 0.7 0.75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports panel estimation results using the ﬁve-year average data over the
period 1980–2003; each country has 5 observations. We include dummy  variables for each time period to control the time
effects. Dependent variables are the capital ﬂight, net capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and total capital outﬂow to GDP
ratios. Explanatory variables included: GDPPC is GDP per capita, PPP. GDPPC2 is the square term of GDPPC. OPENF is the gravity
model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy (10) and autocracy (−10). RIR is the annual domestic
real  interest rate. INF: Annual domestic inﬂation rate, consumer prices (annual %). KAOPEN is the Chinn measure for capital
account openness. OVAL is exchange rate over-valuation. GROWTH is the annual GDP per capita growth rate.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
1980–2003 period, this results in 5 observations for each country. We also include time dummy  and
country dummy  variables in the regressions to control for time effect and country speciﬁc effect. The
equation we use for the panel regressions is
CFit = ˛i + ˇ1Yit + ˇ2Y2it + ˇ3Z ′it + t + εit,
where the subscript i represents country, and subscript t represents time. CFit is average capital ﬂows
as a ratio to GDP; ˛i is a constant country ﬁxed effect; Yit is the average GDP per capita (PPP); and Y2it
is its quadratic form. Z ′
it
is a vector of all other explanatory variables, t is the time effect, and εit is an
error term.
Table 4 shows results from panel regression with both time and country dummies. The panel
regression results support the results from cross-country analysis. The coefﬁcients of GDP per capita
and its quadratic term are consistently signiﬁcant in the both cross-country and panel regressions.
Net capital outﬂows, total capital inﬂows and outﬂows are all linearly and positively correlated with
GDP per capita. When both time and country dummy  variables are included in the regressions, the
effects of the POLITY variable has become weaker, while the effects of trade openness turn negative.
Comparing the cross-country estimation and the panel results suggests that the relationship between
capital ﬂows and GDP per capita are the most robust.
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3.2. Threshold regression
From both the cross-country and the panel regressions, the robust non-linearity between capital
ﬂight and a country’s GDP per capita suggests an inverse U-shape relationship. We  examine further by
applying the threshold regression (Hansen, 1999, 2000). Several points on the threshold estimation
are in order. First, it does not require any speciﬁed functional form of nonlinearity, and the number and
location of thresholds are endogenously determined by the data. Second, it provides an asymptotic
distribution theory to construct conﬁdence intervals for the parameters. A bootstrap method is applied
to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of the threshold effects.
We follow Hansen (1999) by using bootstrap procedure to test the null hypothesis of a linear
formulation against a threshold alternative. The threshold model assumes the data is generated by{
yi, xi, qi
}n
i=1, where yi and qi are observations on the dependent variable and a threshold variable,
respectively, and xi is a p × 1 vector of explanatory variables. The threshold variable qi splits the sample
into different groups. The threshold model is given by
yi = xTi ˇ1 + εi, qi ≤ 
yi = xTi ˇ2 + εi, qi > 
The model can be written in a single equation form by deﬁning a dummy  variable di() = I(qi ≤ )
where I(·) denotes the indicator function. If we denote xi() = xidi(), the above could be expressed as
yi = xiT  ˇ + xiT ()n + εi,
where  ˇ = ˇ2 and n = ˇ1 − ˇ2, which is the threshold effect, allowing all the regression coefﬁcients to
differ between sample groups. The proposed solution is to let n → 0 as n→ ∞.  This can be achieved by
holding ˇ2 ﬁxed thereby making ˇ1 approach ˇ2 as n→ ∞.  Hansen (1999) also provides an algorithm
that searches over the values of  using conditional OLS regressions based on a sequential search over
all  = qi, for i = 1, 2, . . .,  n. The procedure also provides the estimates of  ˇ and .
The hypothesis for the threshold test is whether the threshold model is statistically signiﬁcant
relative to a simple linear speciﬁcation. The null hypothesis describes the simple linear speciﬁcation
and can be expressed as:
H0 : ˇ1 = ˇ2
As the threshold parameter  is not identiﬁed under H0, we follow Hansen (1999) and use a
heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap procedure to test the null hypoth-
esis of a linear formulation against a threshold alternative. The p values are then computed by a ﬁxed
bootstrap method. The xi values are used as regressors and the bootstrap-dependent variable is gen-
erated from N(0, eˆ21), where eˆ is the OLS residual from the estimated threshold model. Hansen (1999)
shows that this procedure yields asymptotically correct p values. Note that if the above null hypoth-
esis is rejected and a threshold level is identiﬁed, we should test again the threshold model against a
linear speciﬁcation after dividing the original sample according to the threshold thus identiﬁed. This
procedure is carried out until the null can no longer be rejected.
In testing the inverse-U relationship hypothesis, we use the following threshold model to conduct
the cross-country TR regressions:
CFi =
{
˛1OPENF + ˛2POLITY + ˛3RIR + ˇ1GDPPC + i + εi GDPPCi ≤ 
˛1OPENF + ˛2POLITY + ˛3RIR + ˇ2GDPPC + i + εi GDPPCi > 
,
where CF is the average capital ﬂight as a ratio to GDP, OPENF is the gravity-ﬁtted trade openness,
POLITY is the political indicator for democracy and autocracy, and RIR is the domestic real interest
rate. GDPPC is GDP per capita (PPP), as the threshold variable to be tested. The focus of this estimation
is the threshold effect of economic development on capital ﬂight, and the estimation of the exact
threshold value.
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Table 5.a
Test results for threshold effects: capital ﬂight.
Threshold variable GDPPC OPENF
Test for single threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 19.890381 6.2803907
Bootstrap p-value 0.001*** 0.895
Threshold estimate 2974.18 –
95% conﬁdence int. [1966.33, 3195.04] –
Test for 2nd threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 16.432665 –
Bootstrap p-value 0.003*** –
Threshold estimate 5034.487 –
95% conﬁdence int. [4719.326, 14498.57] –
Test for 3rd threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 7.7335 –
Bootstrap p-value 0.604 –
Threshold estimate – –
95% conﬁdence int. – –
Notes: This table presents the test results for threshold effects using Hansen (1999) Threshold model. The dependent variable is
capital  ﬂight. Cross-sectional data are used for 97 countries over 1980–2003. Two variables are tested for the threshold effect:
GDP per capita and Trade openness.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
3.2.1. Development threshold & capital ﬂight
The cross-country data are used for threshold estimations because it allows us to divide country into
different stage of development according to their average GDP levels without having to deal with the
time effects. In addition, Hansen’s threshold regression method is suitable for cross-sectional sample
or time series, but not panel data. Owing to data availability, some countries are dropped because of
incomplete data in one or more of the explanatory variables. Subject to data availability and outliers,
the sample for the threshold estimation covers 97 countries.
Results are shown in Tables 5.a and 5.b.  Table 5.a report the likelihood ratio test statistics for the
statistical signiﬁcance of threshold effects as well as their 1000 bootstrap p-value. We  ﬁnd that the
Table 5.b
Threshold estimation: dependent = capital ﬂight.
Variable/threshold Stage 1 estimate Stage 2 estimate Stage 3 estimate
GDPPC ≤ 2974.18 2974.18 < GDPPC ≤ 5034.487 GDPPC > 5034.487
GDPPC 1.73 −0.013 −0.109
(0.58)*** (0.456) (0.054)***
RIR −0.17 0.010 −0.004
(0.039)*** (0.029) (0.022)
POLITY −0.18 0.227 −0.111
(0.10)* (0.109)*** (0.074)*
OPENF −0.03 0.541 0.134
(0.223) (0.180)*** (0.077)***
Constant −2.22 −2.761 3.050
(1.24)* (1.939) (0.760)***
Observations 36 16 44
R-squared 0.53 0.476 0.326
Notes: Values given in parenthesis denotes standard errors. This table reports cross-country regressions using the threshold
model, over the period 1980–2003. Dependent variable is the capital ﬂight to GDP ratio. Explanatory variables: GDPPC is the
GDP per capita, PPP. OPENF is the gravity model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy (10) and
autocracy (−10). RIR is real interest rate.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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test for a single threshold of GDP per capita is signiﬁcant with a 1000 bootstrap p-value of 0.001.
Furthermore, the test for a second threshold of GDP per capita is also statistically signiﬁcant with a
1000 bootstrap p-value of 0.003. However, the test for a third threshold level is not signiﬁcant with a p-
value greater than 0.60. These results provide strong evidence that there exist three stages for capital
ﬂight in terms of a country’s income level. The estimated two threshold levels of income are US$
2,974.18 and US$ 5,034.49 in GDP per capita (PPP): the countries can then be segregated into three
development regimes—36 low income economies, 16 middle income counties and 44 high income
economies (including the 22 industrial countries). We  also test the threshold effect of trade openness
on capital ﬂight, using trade openness as the threshold variable. However, the 1000 bootstrap p-value
for trade openness is 0.895 for single threshold, which is far beyond any acceptable signiﬁcant level.
Therefore, the linear relationship between openness and capital ﬂight cannot be rejected. After ﬁnding
the estimated values for threshold level of income, it is possible to do the separate OLS regressions
by the three different regimes respectively. Table 5.b demonstrates the OLS estimation results for the
three groups of countries. We  include the economic controls that appear statistically signiﬁcant in the
cross sectional estimation (Table 3). The ﬁrst column is for countries below the ﬁrst threshold level
and the last column is for countries above the second threshold level. For countries in the ﬁrst stage
(low income countries with GDP per capita less than US$ 2,974), the relationship between capital
ﬂight and GDP per capita is positive and highly signiﬁcant; while for countries in the third stage (high
income countries with GDP per capita over US$ 5,034), the relationship is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. For countries in the second stage, there is no strong and clear relationship between capital
ﬂight and the economic development. These estimation results conﬁrm the hypothesis of the non-
linear relationship between capital ﬂight and development threshold, based on the capital income
level.
In the threshold regressions, three additional determinants for capital ﬂight are also included,
namely openness, polity and real interest rate. According to the coefﬁcients in Table 5.b,  real interest
rate is negatively correlated with capital ﬂight only for countries in the ﬁrst stage. In the second and
third stages, real interest rate does not inﬂuence capital ﬂight. Polity reduces capital ﬂight in the ﬁrst
and third stages but not for countries in the second stage (between approximately US$ 3,000 to US$
5,000 in GDP per capita), where the effect is the opposite. In terms of trade openness, it is positively
correlated with capital ﬁght in the second and third stage of development. Therefore, for countries
in different stage of development, the economic fundamental that could encourage or reduce capital
ﬂight are not the same.
3.2.2. Development threshold & net capital outﬂow
In order to test if the inverse U-shape is unique for capital ﬂight, we  also conduct the threshold
regressions on net capital outﬂow using income and trade openness as the threshold variables. The
same cross-sectional data for 97 countries are used for the estimation. Table 6.a presents the estimation
results on the threshold effects of GDP per capita and trade openness. The estimation results point two
threshold effects of GDP per capita, but not for trade openness, based on the bootstrap p-value at the
signiﬁcant level of 10% level for single threshold and for second threshold. The estimated threshold
GDP per capita levels are US$ 3,911 and US$ 14,427.
Table 6.b presents the OLS regression results of net capital outﬂows for the three economic
development regimes. For countries with GDP per capita below US$ 3,911, trade openness is pos-
itively associated with net capital outﬂows, while income, real interest rate and polity are all
insigniﬁcant. For countries with GDP per capita between US$ 3,911 and US$ 14,427, none of the
variables explains net capital outﬂows. For countries with GDP per capita over US$ 14,427, not
only the variables are highly signiﬁcant, but they also take the expected signs. In all the three
stages, net capital outﬂow is always positively correlated with GDP per capita. This is the oppo-
site of the pattern observed on capital ﬂight, which is negatively associated with the threshold
income levels. Except capital ﬂight, the other types of capital ﬂows (i.e. capital inﬂows, cap-
ital outﬂows, and net ﬂows) are mostly linearly associated with GDP per capita. Hence, the
inverse U-shape in the relationship of capital ﬂows and income level is quite unique to capital
ﬂight.
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Table 6.a
Test results for threshold effects: net capital outﬂow.
Threshold variable GDPPC OPENF
Test for single threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 20.3753 7.991
Bootstrap p-value 0.000*** 0.628
Threshold estimate 3911.44 –
95% conﬁdence int. [884.626, 14427.79] –
Test for 2nd threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 11.5637 –
Bootstrap p-value 0.066* –
Threshold estimate 14427.79 –
95% conﬁdence int. [11077.36, 15203.92] –
Test for 3rd threshold
Likelihood ratio stat. 9.882 –
Bootstrap p-value 0.127 –
Threshold estimate – –
95% conﬁdence int. – –
Notes: This table presents the test results for threshold effects using Hansen (1999) Threshold model. The dependent variable
is  net capital outﬂow. Cross-sectional data are used for 97 countries over 1980–2003. Two  variables are tested for the threshold
effect: GDP per capita and Trade openness.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
3.3. Robustness checks
To examine the robustness of our baseline ﬁndings (cross section and panel of 5-year averages),
we ﬁrst estimate the panel regressions using annual data. Although there could be considerable noise
and measurement error in annual data, particularly for developing countries, it is nevertheless useful
to examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of data frequency. Using the annual data, we
re-estimate the panel regressions with time and country effects. Using the sample set of economic
controls, Table 7 presents the results, which can be directly compared to the baseline estimation
in Tables 3 and 4. Evidently, the results emerging as qualitatively robust are the positive effects of
economic growth and ﬁnancial openness, while the positive effect of GDP per capita on capital ﬂows
is signiﬁcant throughout.
Table 6.b
Threshold estimation: dependent = net capital outﬂow.
Variable/threshold Stage 1 estimate Stage 2 estimate Stage 3 estimate
GDPPC ≤ 3911.44 3911.44 < GDPPC ≤ 14427.79 GDPPC > 14427.79
GDPPC 0.169 0.104 0.609
(0.926) (0.134) (0.154)***
RIR −0.144 −0.008 −0.237
(0.091) (0.025) (0.090)***
POLITY −0.130 −0.062 −0.823
(0.134) (0.075) (0.073)***
OPENF 0.837 0.052 0.154
(0.405)*** (0.067) (0.053)***
Constant −8.338 −2.612 −4.930
(1.593)*** (1.015)*** (2.577)***
Observations 43 30 24
R-squared 0.216 0.096 0.67
Notes: Values given in parenthesis denote standard errors. This table reports cross-country regressions using the threshold
model. Average data are used for all the variables over the period 1980–2003. Dependent variable is the net capital outﬂow to
GDP  ratio. Explanatory variables: GDPPC is the GDP per capita, PPP. OPENF is the gravity model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is
the  political rating of democracy (10) and autocracy (−10). RIR is the annual domestic real interest rate.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table  7
Panel regression using annual data.
CFlight/GDP NetOut/GDP Inﬂow/GDP Outﬂow/GDP
GDPPC 2.68 0.82 0.464 1.037
(0.513)*** (0.293)*** (0.096)*** (0.091)***
GDPPC2 −0.046 – – –
(0.013)*** – – –
RIR −0.032 −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(0.009)*** (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
INF 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
POLITY −0.321 0.083 0.006 −0.03
(0.095)*** (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
OPENF −0.56 −0.469 −0.574 −0.664
(0.330)* (0.188)** (0.157)*** (0.149)***
GROWTH −0.161 −0.13 0.08 0.077
(0.068)** (0.039)*** (0.035)** (0.032)**
KAOPEN 0.757 0.34 0.517 0.17
(0.370)** (0.21) (0.182)*** (0.18)
OVAL −0.007 −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −34.857 −13.69 −1.111 −0.455
(9.470)*** (5.397)** (3.66) (3.48)
Country dummy  Yes
Year dummy  Yes
Observations 1021 1021 958 946
R-squared 0.39 0.66 0.44 0.56
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports panel estimation results using annual data over the period 1980–2003.
Subject to data availability, the panel is not balanced. We include dummy  variables for each time period and also for each country
to  control for time and country speciﬁc effects. Dependent variables are the capital ﬂight, net capital outﬂow, total capital inﬂow
and  total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios. Explanatory variables include: GDPPC is GDP per capita, PPP. GDPPC2 is the square term
of  GDPPC.  OPENF is the gravity model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy (10) and autocracy (−10).
RIR  is the annual domestic real interest rate. INF: Annual domestic inﬂation rate, consumer prices (annual %). KAOPEN is the
Chinn-Ito measure for capital account openness. OVAL is exchange rate over-valuation. GROWTH is the annual GDP per capita
growth rate.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Serial correlation may  inﬂuence the regression on panels. We  next include a lagged term of capital
ﬂows as an additional explanatory variable; with CFit−1 representing the lagged capital ﬂows:
CFit = ˛i + ˇ1CFit−1 + ˇ2Yit + ˇ3Y2it + ˇ4Z ′it + t + εit
As shown in Table 8, the coefﬁcients of the lagged terms are all signiﬁcantly positive across capital
ﬂow equations, suggesting the important of persistency in capital ﬂow adjustment on the annual basis.
Adding these lagged terms does not affect the importance of GDP per capita, economic growth, and
ﬁnancial openness.
4. Financial turbulence, capital ﬂows, and control measures
In this section, we offer a case study of two emerging markets. Based on the latest statistics from
World Bank, the GDP per capita of Brazil is US$ 7,990 (in PPP) in 2003 and rises to US$ 10,055 by
the end of 2010. For Korea, its GDP per capita is US$ 21,070 in 2003 and increases to US$ 27,026
in 2010. Not only these two countries have registered the level of GDP per capita that is above our
estimated development threshold level, but they are also among the fast growing emerging economies
on average during the past decade. From 2004–07, the average growth of GDP per capita is 3.6 percent
for Brazil and 4.4 percent for Korea. In 2008, Brazil’s growth is 4.21 percent, drops to −1.52 in 2009,
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Table 8
Panel regression result using annual data with lagged dependent.
CFlight/GDP NetOut/GDP Inﬂow/GDP Outﬂow/GDP
GDPPC 1.633 −0.081 0.482 0.807
(0.543)*** (0.28) (0.103)*** (0.098)***
GDPPC2 −0.028 – – –
(0.014)** – – –
RIR −0.027 −0.008 0.000 −0.001
(0.009)*** (0.004)* (0.00) (0.00)
INF 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
POLITY −0.261 0.047 0.015 −0.013
(0.101)*** (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
OPENF −0.444 −0.085 −0.604 −0.456
(0.35) (0.18) (0.170)*** (0.152)***
GROWTH −0.149 −0.121 0.079 0.059
(0.069)** (0.035)*** (0.036)** (0.032)*
KAOPEN 0.731 0.071 0.477 0.207
(0.371)** (0.19) (0.189)** (0.18)
OVAL −0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LAG TERM 0.254 0.451 0.213 0.631
(0.033)*** (0.030)*** (0.046)*** (0.056)***
Constant 5.103 −2.053 −0.865 −0.495
(7.48) (3.83) (3.66) (3.28)
Country dummy  Yes
Year dummy Yes
Observations 983 983 915 898
R-squared 0.42 0.72 0.46 0.63
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports panel estimation results with lagged dependent using annual data over
the  period 1980–2003. Subject to data availability, the panel is not balanced. We include dummy  variables for each time period
and also for each country to control for time and country speciﬁc effects. Dependent variables are the capital ﬂight, net capital
outﬂow, total capital inﬂow and total capital outﬂow to GDP ratios. Explanatory variables include: GDPPC is GDP per capita, PPP.
GDPPC2 is the square term of GDPPC. OPENF is the gravity model ﬁtted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy
(10)  and autocracy (−10). RIR is the annual domestic real interest rate. INF: Annual domestic inﬂation rate, consumer prices
(annual %). KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito measure for capital account openness. OVAL is exchange rate over-valuation. GROWTH is
the  annual GDP per capita growth rate.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
and bounces to 6.55 percent in 2010. Korea follows the similar pattern, with the growth rate of 1.98
in 2008, 0.03 in 2009, and 5.88 in 2010.
As a result of the strong growth performance of Brazil and Korea prior to the crisis of 2008, and
the subsequent volatile growth rates, the two  countries have witnessed some dramatic ﬂuctuations,
surges, and stops of capital ﬂows into their economies. From 2004–07, driven by capital inﬂows, the
currencies of Brazil and Korea are markedly appreciating against the US$; see Figs. 5 and 6. To manage
the volatility of capital inﬂows, Brazil and Korea have introduced a number of control measures.
Brazil ﬁrst announced the introduction of its taxes on investments by foreigners in the local bond
market on March 12, 2008.6 The tax is a 1.5 percent ﬁnancial transaction tax, known as the IOF.
However, following the collapse of Lehman and the ensuing 2008 global crisis, the tax was subsequent
eliminated, together with a 0.38 percent tax on foreign currency loans, on October 23, 2008.
As growth returns in early 2009, foreign capitals are piling into Brazil again and its currency resumes
appreciating against the US$. Brazil introduced a government’s 2 per cent tax on foreign portfolio
investments aimed at stemming the rapid rise of its exchange rate on October 20, 2009. This inﬂow
6 The sources of our list of control announcements are extracted from Reuters and Financial Times. See also Magud, Reinhart,
and  Rogoff (2011) and Qureshi, Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon (2011).
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Fig. 5. Brazil, inﬂows, and capital controls, 2004–11. This ﬁgure provides the quarterly plots of exchange per US$, GDP, and
capital inﬂows. The shaded parts are the periods when major capital control measures are imposed.
tax was followed by a number of measures, including implementing ADR tax of 1.5% on November 18,
2009; increasing IOF from 2 to 4 percent on October 4, 2010, and to 6 percent on October 18, 2010.
The measures seemingly have their intended effects of stemming the capital inﬂows and exchange
appreciation. Nonetheless, as the Eurozone crisis has intensiﬁed in 2010 and the resultant shortage of
global liquidity, the IOF has been cut to 2 percent on January 3, 2011. In half a year, Brazil imposes a
1 percent tax on trading in currency derivatives on July 27, 2011. Then on December 1, 2011, Brazil
announces that the inﬂow tax would be reduced.
Towards early 2007, the exchange rate of Korea has been appreciating against the US$ and the capi-
tal inﬂows surges quarter-on-quarter basis; see Fig. 6. Korea ﬁrst imposed on April 2007 its restrictions
Fig. 6. Korea, inﬂows, and capital controls, 2004–11. This ﬁgure provides the quarterly plots of exchange per US$, GDP, and
capital  inﬂows. The shaded parts are the periods when major capital control measures are imposed.
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Fig. 7. Korea and volatility of capital ﬂows, 2004–11. This plot shows the volatility of capital inﬂows and outﬂows. Based on the
quarterly IMF  data, each dot denotes the annual average capital ﬂows, while the height of vertical bars provides the maximum
and  the minimum of quarterly capital ﬂows in each year.
on foreign banks’ borrowing dollars from abroad (i.e. to discourage swapping dollars borrowed abroad
for Korean won). The measure had a signiﬁcant effect on foreign banks’ cross-border claims on banks in
Korea during the second and third quarters of 2007.7 While the control seems to have some intended
effect, shortly after Korea was hit by sharp capital outﬂow and currency depreciation due to a mount-
ing concern over its large private external debts, ampliﬁed by the onset of 2008 global crisis. These
periods are also marked by a huge volatility of capital ﬂows, particularly the outﬂows, the level not
seen since the crisis of 1998, as shown in Fig. 7.
As growth returns in 2009, foreign capitals surge into Korea again. Korea imposed on November
19, 2009 restrictions on banks’ foreign exchange transaction to tighten its control over foreign cur-
rency liquidity at local banks to make them less vulnerable. The measure is followed by limits on
banks’ currency forwards trades on June 9, 2010; proﬁt tax on foreigners’ investment to curb capi-
tal inﬂows on October 19, 2010; new regulations on equity derivatives trading on January 11, 2011;
prohibit ﬁnancial companies from buying locally issued foreign-currency bonds for domestic use (to
temper the resurgent won and reduce short-term foreign debt) on July 19, 2011; plans to impose
taxes on the earnings of overseas investors from foreign currency bonds sold in the country in its
latest effort to curb rising short-term external debt and counter capital inﬂows on September 7,
2011.
The experiences of Brazil and Korea highlight the challenge of managing capital ﬂows in the era
of ﬁnancial globalization. The economies of Brazil and Korea are by now a distance beyond many
other emerging markets in terms of their economic development and openness. While the capital
ﬂight is no longer the threat to these two countries, the volatility of foreign capitals, both inﬂows and
outﬂows, still does. The difﬁculty has to do with the speed that foreign capitals are moving in and out
of the country. As the evidence of Brazil and Korea shows, the decisions to implement capital control
measures tend to be pushed around by the feedbacks among economic growth, currency appreciation,
and the global ﬁnancial conditions.
7 See Kawai and Lamberte (2010).
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5. Conclusion
We report cross-sectional and panel estimation results of capital ﬂow patterns controlling for a
number of economic development variables. The variation of capital ﬂows across time and countries
is signiﬁcantly associated with a country’s income level as measured by GDP per capita. Capital ﬂight
has a unique non-linear relationship with the income level. Using the Hansen threshold estimation
method, we identify a three-stage development threshold effect of income level to determine the
cutoffs of GDP per capita that affect capital ﬂight across countries. Based on a case study of Brazil and
Korea, both of which are beyond the threshold development level, we study their recent management
of capital ﬂows and ﬁnd that a country’s decision to implement the control measure may  appear ﬁckle
and depends on the global market conditions, especially since the crisis of 2008.
Appendix A. Variable List
Dependent Variables:
Capital Flight: 1980–2003. Volume of annual capital ﬂight in measured in US dollars using the World Bank residue method.
The  formula for our computation is CF = Debt + FI −CAD −FR, where all items are annual data measured in US dollars
for  current year price index. Data on foreign investment, current account deﬁcit and change in foreign reserve are from the
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005. Data on change in external debt for most of the developing countries are from
WDI,  with some supplemental data from Source OECD. Data on external debt for industrial countries are from the
National Accounts of Source OECD, under the term of Net lending (borrowing).
CFlight/GDP:  1980–2003. Capital ﬂight as a ratio of GDP. Data on GDP for all countries are from WDI, in current year US
dollars.
Net  Capital Outﬂow: 1980–2003. Data on net capital outﬂow, which is represented by a current account surplus, are the sum
of  net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. Data are obtained from the WDI  in current U.S.
dollars. A positive ﬁgure, or a surplus, implies net capital outﬂow from and country, and a negative ﬁgure implies net
capital inﬂow.
NetOut/GDP: 1980–2003. Net capital outﬂow as a ratio to GDP. Data on GDP for all countries are from WDI, in current year US
dollars.
Total Capital Inﬂow: 1980–2003. It is the sum of short- and long-term capital inﬂows as reported under FDI inﬂow and
portfolio inﬂow in the balance of payment. Data on FDI and portfolio investment ﬂows are obtained from the
International Financial Statistics (Lines 78bed and 78bgd). The dataset covers 119 countries over the period of 1980–2004.
Inﬂow/GDP: 1980–2003. Total capital inﬂow as a ratio to GDP. Data on GDP for all countries are from WDI, in current year US
dollars.
Total  Capital Outﬂow: 1980–2003. Volume of annul normal capital outﬂow measured in current US dollars. Normal capital
outﬂow is computed by the sum of Foreign Direct Investment outﬂow and portfolio outﬂow. Data on FDI and portfolio
outﬂow are from the International Financial Statistics (lines 78bdd and 78bfd respectively).
Outﬂow/GDP: 1980–2003. Total capital outﬂow as a ratio to GDP. Data on GDP for all countries are from WDI, in current year
US  dollars.
Explanatory Variables:
GDPPC: 1980–2003. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP, constant 2000 international $). GDP PPP is gross
domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the
same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. Data are obtained from WDI  in constant 2000
international dollars.
POLITY:  1980–2003. It is the POLITY2 index from the Polity IV dataset, with a range from −10 to 10 (−10 = high autocracy;
10  = high democracy). It is a combined polity score computed by subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC. DEMOC—Democracy
Score  (numeric) Range = 0–10 (0 = low; 10 = high): general openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy
scale is constructed additively. AUTOC—Autocracy Score (numeric) Range = 0–10 (0 = low; 10 = high): general closedness
of  political institutions. The 11-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively.
INST (Institutions): 1984–2000. Follow Alfaro 2008, we construct a yearly composite index using International Country Risk
Guide’s (ICRG) variables from the PRS Group. The composite index is the sum of the 11 indices: investment proﬁle,
government stability, internal conﬂict, external conﬂict, no-corruption, non-militarized politics, protection from religious
tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. This index takes
values from 0 to 10 for each country, where a higher score means lower risk.
SCHOOL: Years of Schooling: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999. Average years of secondary, higher and total
schooling in the total population. Data are from Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000), International Data on
Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications, Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
CAP  INX: 1980–2000. Restrictions to Capital Mobility constructed by Edwards (2005). It is a new index on capital mobility
that  combines information from Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002). The new index has a scale from 0 to 100,
where higher numbers denote a higher degree of capital mobility; a score of 100 denotes absolutely free capital mobility.
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KAOPEN: 1980–2003. Kaopen is an index to measure a country’s degree of capital account openness constructed by Chinn
and Ito (2006).  It is based on the binary dummy  variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border
ﬁnancial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Source:
Chinn–Ito (2006) Financial Openness measure.
INF:  1980–2003. Annual domestic inﬂation rate, consumer prices (annual %) Inﬂation as measured by the consumer price
index reﬂects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a ﬁxed basket of goods and
services that may  be ﬁxed or changed at speciﬁed intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.
GROWTH: 1980–2003. GDP per capita growth (annual %) from the WDI. It is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per
capita based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.
RIR:  1980–2003. Real interest rate (%) from the WDI. It is the lending interest rate adjusted for inﬂation as measured by the
GDP  deﬂator.
OPENF: 1980–200. Trade openness by gravity model ﬁtted value constructed by Andrew K. Rose 2002.
OVAL: 1980–1998. Over or under-valuation of the exchange rate, calculated by dividing the black-market exchange rate by
the  ofﬁcial exchange rate (S*/S −1). A positive ﬁgure indicates over-valuation and a negative ﬁgure indicates
undervaluation. Source: IFS and World Currency Year Book.
Appendix B. Country list (by thresholds in Table 6.b)
Countries in Stage 1, GDPPC ≤ US$3911.44 (54 Countries):
Albania, Guatemala, Pakistan
Angola, Haiti, Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh, Honduras, Philippines,
Benin, India, Rwanda,
Bolivia, Indonesia, Samoa
Burkina Faso, Jamaica, Senegal,
Burundi, Kenya, Sierra Leone,
Cameroon, Lao PDR, Solomon Islands
Cape Verde Lesotho Sri Lanka,
Central African Republic, Madagascar, Sudan
Chad, Mali, Swaziland
China, Mauritania, Syrian Arab Republic,
Comoros Morocco, Tanzania,
Congo, Rep., Mozambique, Togo,
Cote d’Ivoire Nepal, Uganda,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Vanuatu
Egypt, Arab Rep., Niger, Zambia,
Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe
Countries in Stage 2, US$3911.44 < GDPPC ≤ US$14427.29 (44 Countries):
Antigua and Barbuda Grenada Poland,
Argentina Hungary Portugal,
Bahrain Iran, Islamic Rep. Romania
Belize Jordan Saudi Arabia
Botswana Korea, Rep. Seychelles
Brazil Lebanon South Africa,
Bulgaria Malaysia St. Kitts and Nevis
Chile Malta St. Lucia
Colombia Mauritius Thailand,
Costa Rica Mexico Trinidad and Tobago,
Dominica Namibia Tunisia,
Dominican Republic Oman Turkey
El  Salvador Panama Uruguay,
Fiji  Paraguay Venezuela, RB
Gabon Peru
Countries in Stage 3, GDPPC > US$14427.29 (32 Countries):
Australia Germany New Zealand
Austria Greece Norway
Bahamas, The Iceland Sao Tome and Principe
Barbados Ireland Singapore
Belgium Israel Spain
Bhutan Italy Suriname
Canada Japan Sweden
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Cyprus Kuwait Switzerland
Denmark Libya United Kingdom
Finland Maldives United States
France Netherlands
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